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1 Introduction 
The International Court of Justice,1 is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations 
(UN). Its function is to decide cases on the basis of international law, and to give advisory 
opinions when requested to do so by an authorized body or agency. However, the 
jurisdiction of the Court is not obligatory in the sense that it is bound to act when a request 
is put forward. 
 
The topic of this thesis is the discretion of the Court in its advisory proceedings. In this 
essay I will give an analysis of the possibility for the ICJ to decline to give an advisory 
opinion. This discretion is guided by the Court’s character as a principal organ of the 
United Nations, and the Courts judicial character when giving the advisory opinions. 
The discretionary power of the Court will, in particular, be analysed in view of the recent 
case concerning the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian territory, given by the ICJ on July 9, 2004.2 
 
In chapter two I will give an introduction to the history and function of the International 
Court of Justice, focusing particularly on advisory opinions.  
Chapter three will contain a summary of the Wall opinion and the arguments put forward in 
this case when contending that the Court should exercise its discretion and refuse to give an 
opinion. These arguments will be discussed and analysed in chapter four, in view of 
relevant statements and previous practice of the ICJ.  
 
                                                 
1 Also referred to as the Court, the International Court or the ICJ. 
2 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion 
9 July 2004 (ICJ Reports 2004, p 136). Also referred to in this essay as the Wall case or the Wall opinion. 
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The effect of advisory opinions and in particular the effect of the Wall opinion will be 
pointed out in chapter five. Finally, in chapter six I will look at the possibilities of 
extending the jurisdiction of the International Court. 
2 The International Court of Justice 
2.1 The History and Function of the ICJ 
2.1.1 International Dispute Settlement Procedures 
Article 33 of the United Nations Charter lists the following methods for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes between States: negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, 
judicial settlement, and the resort to regional agencies or arrangements, to which good 
offices should also be added. Some of these methods involve appealing to third parties.  
Mediation for example places the disputing parties in a position in which they can 
themselves resolve their dispute thanks to the influence of a third party. Arbitration goes 
further, in the sense that the dispute is in fact submitted to an impartial third party, who 
awards a decision so that a binding settlement can be achieved. The same is true for judicial 
settlement, except that, regarding procedural matters, a court is subject to stricter rules than 
an arbitral tribunal.3 Historically speaking, mediation and arbitration preceded judicial 
settlement. The former was known in ancient India and in the Islamic world, whilst 
numerous examples of the latter are to be found in ancient Greece and, China, among the 
Arabian tribes, in the early Islamic world and in maritime customary law in medieval 
Europe.4 
 
                                                 
3 Shaw, M, International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003) p 916. 
4 The history and function of the International Court of Justice, chapter 1, p 1 [online]. Based on a booklet 
prepared on occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the ICJ (1946-1996): http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/ibbook/Bbookframepage.htm 
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The origins of modern arbitration are recognized as dating from the so-called Jay Treaty of 
1794,5 between the United States and Great Britain, which settled a number of questions 
resulting from the American War of Independence. The Jay Treaty led to a general interest 
in the possibilities of using legal and judicial techniques as a method of resolving certain 
types of international conflicts.6 
 
A major development in the history of international adjudication occurred in the Alabama 
Claims case of 1872. Under the Treaty of Washington of 1871,7 the United States and the 
United Kingdom had agreed to submit to arbitration claims by the US for alleged breaches 
of neutrality by the UK during the American civil war. This arbitration tribunal was to 
consist of five members: Heads of State of the United States, United Kingdom, Brazil, Italy 
and Switzerland. The US and UK agreed to certain rules governing the duties of neutral 
governments to be applied by the tribunal.8 
 
The proceedings in the Alabama Claims case served as a demonstration of the effectiveness 
of arbitration in the settlement of a major dispute, and resulted in the Hague Conferences of 
1899 and 1907.9 Along with other matters, these conferences attempted to find a way of 
repairing a number of obvious weaknesses in the system and practice of international 
arbitration, as it had been developing during the nineteenth century. All the instances of 
international arbitration up to this time had been marked by acute political difficulties in 
reaching an agreement on the composition and procedure of the arbitral tribunal and on 
fixing the points on which it was to be asked to decide. This was because no standing 
arbitral machinery and no clearly accepted concepts of international arbitral procedure 
                                                 
5 Jay Treaty, 19 November, 1794. 
6 Rosenne, S., Rosenne’s The World Court. What It is and how It works (Leyden: Nijhoff Publishers 2003) 
pp.1-2. 
7 Treaty of Washington, Washington D.C. 8 May, 1871. 
8 History and function of the ICJ, supra note 4, chapter 1, p 1. 
9 Rosenne, supra note 6. 
 4
existed.10 The idea of creating a world court for the international community developed as a 
result of the atmosphere engendered by the Hague Conferences, and in 1900 the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration was established, beginning to operate in 1902.11 This marked an 
important step forward in the consolidation of an international legal system.  
 
However, no lasting steps were taken until after the end of the First World War. One of the 
reasons for the difficulties confronting all the earlier attempts to establish permanent 
international tribunals of general jurisdiction was the absence of any central political 
administration for the international community. This changed with the establishment of the 
League of Nations by the Peace Treaties of 1919.12 
 
2.1.2 The Permanent Court of International Justice 
Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations gave the Council of the League 
responsibility for formulating plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of 
International Justice.13 Such a court was to be competent not only to hear and determine 
any dispute of an international character submitted to it by the disputing parties, but also to 
give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by 
the Assembly.14 The PCIJ was intended as a way to prevent outbreaks of violence by 
enabling easily accessible methods of dispute settlement through an available legal and 
organisational framework.15 
 
                                                 
10 Rosenne, supra note 6. 
11 History and function of the ICJ, supra note 4, chapter 1, p 3. 
12 Peace Treaties, Paris Peace Conference, 18 January 1919 – 21 January 1920. 
13 Hereafter referred to as the PCIJ or the Permanent Court. 
14 History and function of the ICJ, supra note 4, chapter 1, p 4. 
15 Rosenne, S., The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-1996, Volume II, Jurisdiction (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International 1997). 
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Despite Article 14 of the Covenant, the PCIJ, which was in existence from 1922 until the 
dissolution of the League on 18 April 1946, was not formally an organ of the League. The 
fact that a State was a member of the League did not automatically make it a party to the 
Statute of the Court.16 
 
Between 1922 and 1940 the PCIJ dealt with 32 contentious cases between States and gave 
27 advisory opinions.17 The Court helped resolve some serious international disputes, many 
consequences of the First World War, and in addition made a significant contribution to the 
development of international law.18 Some of the advisory opinions the Permanent Court 
dealt with were, amongst others, the case concerning German settlers in Poland,19 the 
Status of Eastern Carelia case,20 and the Greco-Bulgarian “Communities” case.21 
 
The PCIJ was dissolved after the Second World War. It was decided at the San Francisco 
Conference in April 1945 to create an entirely new court, which would be a principal 
judicial organ of the United Nations, with the Statute annexed to and forming part of the 
United Nations Charter.22 This new world court was named the International Court of 
Justice.23 
 
                                                 
16 Rosenne, supra note 6, p 10. 
17 History and function of the ICJ, supra note 4, p 5. 
18 Ibid, p 13 and Rosenne, supra note 6, p 5. 
19 Questions relating to Settlers of German origin in Poland, Advisory Opinion, No. 5 (PCIJ, Ser. B., No. 5, 
1923). 
20 Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion No. 5 (PCIJ, Ser. B., No. 5, 1923). 
21 The Greco-Bulgarian “Communities” Advisory Opinion (PCIJ, Ser. B., No. 17, 1930). 
22 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945. The Statute of the Court is an integral part of the Charter. 
23 History and Function of the ICJ, supra note 4, p 7. 
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2.1.3 The ICJ as the Principal Judicial Organ of the UN 
Today, there is a specific organic link established between the ICJ and the UN. This differs 
from the Permanent Court - League connection. 
Article 7 of the United Nations Charter establishes the principal organs of the United 
Nations. These are the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social 
Council, the Trusteeship Council,24 the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat. 
Article 92 of the Charter states that the Court shall be the principal judicial organ of the 
United Nations, and that it shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is 
based upon the statute of the Permanent Court. It is stated in Article 1 of the Statute that the 
Court established by the Charter as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations shall 
function in accordance with the provisions of the Statute. These provisions contain the 
general arrangement determining the position of the Court within the organization of the 
UN.25 
The constitutional integration of the present Court with the United Nations is distinct from 
the Permanent Court which was not expressly made an organ of the League of Nations, and 
whose Statute was separate from the Covenant.26 However, in essence, the ICJ is a 
continuation of the Permanent Court, with virtually the same statute and jurisdiction, and 
with a continuing line of cases, no distinction being made between those decided by the 
PCIJ and those decided currently by the ICJ.27 
The ambiguous characteristic of the relations between the League of Nations and the 
Permanent Court has now been replaced by clarity. The Statute of the Court is no longer a 
separate international treaty, but an integral part of the Charter. Consequently every 
member of the United Nations is thus ipso facto a party to the Statute of the Court. This 
                                                 
24 The Trusteeship Council is now defunct. 
25 Statute of the Court, Article 1. 
26 Pratap, D., The Advisory Function of the International Court (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1972) p 145. 
27 Shaw, supra note 3, p 960 and Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 1996) p 678. 
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emphasizes the quality and status of the Court as the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations.28 
 
2.1.4 The Function of the ICJ 
The most important task of the ICJ is to decide disputes between States in accordance with 
the provisions of its Statute. However, this function is not limited to disputes between 
States which are members of the United Nations. Non-member States can also be parties in 
cases before the Court, as applicant or as respondent.29 In addition, the Court supplies 
judicial guidance and support for the work of other United Nations organs and for the 
autonomous specialized agencies through the provision of advisory opinions.30 
 
The establishment of the Court as one of the principal judicial organs of the United Nations 
means that it exists on a par with the other principal organs. It is neither in a position of 
superiority nor one of inferiority in relation to the others. One consequence of this is that 
the Court is not a general “constitutional Court” of the UN. There is no duty on any organ 
of the UN, any State or on any person to seek its opinion when a legal question, including a 
question of the interpretation of an instrument such as the Charter or the Rules of 
Procedure, arises in the course of the activities of an organ. Nor does the Court have the 
general power of judicial review to determine the “constitutionality” of the actions or 
decisions of any other organ or subdivision of the United Nations. It can only act in 
response to a contentious or advisory case duly brought before it.31 
                                                 
28 Rosenne, supra note 6, p 15. 
29 Statute of the Court, Article 35. 
30 Statute of the Court, Chapter IV, and Rosenne, supra note 6, p 23. 
31 Rosenne, supra note 6, pp 28-29. 
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The judgement of the Court in a contentious case is final and without appeal, and is only 
binding on the parties in respect of that particular case.32 
 
2.1.5 Composition of the Court 
The ICJ is composed of fifteen members.33 The members of the Court are elected by the 
Member States of the UN and other States that are parties to the Statute of the ICJ.34 Voting 
takes place both in the General Assembly and the Security Council.35 The Court is not 
composed of representatives of governments, unlike most other organs of international 
organizations. Members of the Court are independent judges and required to exercise their 
powers impartially and conscientiously.36 
 
2.1.6 The Jurisdiction of the ICJ 
The ICJ is a judicial institution that decides cases on the basis of the existing international 
law at the date of the decision. It is not a legislative organ and can thus, not formally create 
law. The Court has emphasised that:  
“it states the existing law and does not legislate. This is so even if, in stating and 
applying the law, the Court necessarily has to specify its scope and sometimes note 
its general trend.”37 
 
The jurisdiction of the ICJ falls into two distinct parts: its capacity to decide disputes 
between states, and its capacity to give advisory opinions when requested to do so by 
                                                 
32 Statute of the Court, Article 59 and 60. See also UN Charter, Article 94(1) and (2) and Rosenne, supra note 
6, p 34. 
33 Statute of the Court, Article 3(1). See also Rules of Court, 14 April 1978, Part I, section A. 
34 Statute of the Court, Article 4. 
35 Statute of the Court, Article 8. 
36 History and function of the ICJ, supra note 4, chapter 2, p 2. 
37 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion 8 July 1996 (ICJ Reports 1996, pp 
226-227), cited in Shaw, supra note 3, p 967. 
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particular qualified entities. The latter is the topic of this essay, but I will first give a 
general introduction to the Court’s contentious jurisdiction when deciding disputes between 
States. 
 
2.1.7 Contentious Jurisdiction 
According to article 34 of the Statute, only States may be parties in cases before the Court. 
Therefore, private persons and international organizations are prohibited from resolving 
disputes in contentious cases through the ICJ. 
 
The Court is open to all states that are parties to the Statute. The non-members of the UN 
may become a party to the Statute on conditions determined by the General Assembly upon 
the recommendation of the Security Council.38 
 
Article 36(1) of its Statute gives the Court jurisdiction in all cases referred to it by parties, 
and regarding all matters specially provided for in the UN Charter or in treaties or 
conventions in force. 
 
The jurisdiction of the Court is based on the consent of the parties. This is a consequence of 
a general principle in international law according to which no state is obliged to submit any 
dispute with another state, or to give an account of itself to any international tribunal. This 
principle is reflected in Article 36 of the Statute, and rests on international practice in the 
settlement of disputes and is a corollary of the sovereign equality of states.39   
 
                                                 
38 UN Charter, Article 93(2). 
39 Rosenne, supra note 15, p 563 and Brownlie, supra note 27, p 681. 
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According to the UN Charter Article 94, States are obliged to comply with the decisions of 
the Court in contentious cases. However, Article 59 of the Statute provides that only parties 
in the particular case before the Court are bound by the decision. 
 
2.2 Advisory Opinions 
2.2.1 History and Purpose of the Advisory Function  
In addition to having the capacity to decide disputes between states, the ICJ is also, as 
stated above, entitled to give advisory opinions. The advisory jurisdiction of the Court had 
its starting-point in Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Similarly, the ICJ 
was given the jurisdiction to provide UN organs with legal opinions upon their request. 
 
The jurisdiction to give advisory opinions was given to the Court for several reasons; its 
purpose was to assist the organs and agencies in deciding on the course of action they 
should follow. It might also furnish them with legal advice and guidance in respect of 
disputes submitted to it and for action in all future cases and situations.40 In addition it can 
be argued that the advisory jurisdiction of the Court might simply be one way of gaining 
time and avoiding the necessity for an immediate decision, or may even help to eliminate 
further controversy over the legal aspects of a dispute or by having a calming effect on the 
parties.41 It has been noted that the value of the advisory function can, in international 
relations, sometimes be more important than judgements, as the persuasive nature of advice 
is frequently superior to force and coercion.42 
 
                                                 
40 Pratap, supra note 26, p 5. 
41 Amr, M., The Role of the International Court of Justice as the Principal Judicial Organ of the United 
Nations (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2003) p 48. 
42 Hudson, M., The Permanent Court of International Justice 1920-1942 (New York: Macmillan 1943) p 524. 
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2.2.2 The Advisory Jurisdiction of the ICJ 
The ICJ has the authority to give advisory opinions by virtue of Article 65(1) of its Statute;     
“The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of 
whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations to make such a request.” 
 
In addition, article 96(2) of the UN Charter empowers the General Assembly and Security 
Council to request such an opinion, and provides that on the authorization of the General 
Assembly a similar power may be given to other organs or specialized agencies.43  
Consequently, three conditions must be satisfied in order to find the jurisdiction of the 
Court when a request for an advisory opinion is submitted to by a specialized agency: the 
agency requesting the opinion must be duly authorized, under the Charter, to request 
opinions from the Court; the opinion requested must be regarding a legal question; and this 
question must be one arising within the scope of the activities of the requesting agency. 
At present, there are 22 organs and agencies that have the right to ask the Court for an 
advisory opinion on a legal question. These are amongst others the General Assembly, 
Security Council, the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO).44  
 
The precise circumstances in which each agency may avail itself of the Court’s advisory 
jurisdiction are specified either in the organisation or agency’s constitutive act, constitution 
or statute.45 Advisory opinions may be requested relating to the interpretation of these texts 
or of the Charter of the United Nations. It may concern disagreements between two or more 
organs or agencies inter se, an organ or agency and one or more of its staff members, an 
                                                 
43 Brownlie, supra note 27, p 691 and Rosenne, supra note 15, pp 682-686. 
44 See index in chapter 8.1 for an overview of organs and agencies entitled to ask the ICJ for an advisory 
opinion. 
45 History and function of the ICJ, supra note 4, chapter 6, p 1. 
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organ or agency and one or more of its member States, or two or more States Members of 
the same organ or agency inter se. 
 
However, there is no obligation on any organ of the UN to seek the Court’s opinion when a 
legal question arises in the course of the activities. 
 
2.2.3 Advisory Opinions vs. Contentious cases 
The main difference between advisory opinions and contentious cases is that in advisory 
matters there are technically no ‘parties’ and no binding ‘decision’. The role of individual 
States in advisory cases is essentially to supply information.46 
 
For access to the advisory competence, the concurrence of other States is required, 
expressed in the form of a resolution requesting the Court to give its opinion. In 
contentious jurisdiction however, a State can go to the Court of its own accord.47 
 
However, the procedure regarding advisory opinions is based on the provisions in the 
Statute of the Court and Rules of Court relating to contentious proceedings, to the extent 
that it recognizes them to be applicable.48 
 
As mentioned in section 2.2.1, the purpose of the advisory opinion is to assist the political 
organs in settling disputes and to provide authoritative guidance on points of law arising 
from the function of organs and specialized agencies.49 Unlike contentious cases, advisory 
opinions are not meant to settle, at least directly, inter-state disputes, but rather to:  
                                                 
46 Rosenne, supra note 6, p 87. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Statute of the Court, Article 68. 
49 Brownlie, supra note 27, p 691. 
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“offer legal advice to the organs and institutions requesting the opinion”.50  
 
Accordingly, the fact that the question put to the Court does not relate to a specific dispute 
does not affect the competence of the Court, nor does it matter that the question posed is 
abstract in nature. The Court will not regard either the origins or the political history of the 
request, nor the distribution of votes with regard to the relevant resolution. The fact that 
any answer given by the Court might become a factor in relation to the subject matter of the 
request in other fora is also irrelevant in determining the appropriate response of the Court 
to the request for the advisory opinion.51 
 
2.2.4 Discretion 
The discretionary power of the Court, founded on article 65(1) of the Statute, implies that 
once it is established that the Court is competent to answer a request, it is not obliged to do 
so: 
“(…) the Court is only authorized, not obliged, to give advisory opinions. The Court 
may, for reasons completely within its discretion, refuse to give an advisory opinion, 
requested in conformity with the Charter”.52 
 
This means that the Court has the right to refuse an opinion if it considers that there are 
reasons which make it improper to accede to the request. In the Peace Treaties advisory 
opinion the Court affirmed the permissive wording of Article 65 of the Statute when it 
states that:  
 
“Article 65 of the Statute is permissive. It gives the Court the power to examine 
whether the circumstances of the case are of such a character as should lead it to 
decline to answer the Request”.53  
                                                 
50 ICJ Reports 1996 pp 226, 236, cited in Shaw, supra note 3, p 1001. 
51 Shaw, supra note 3, pp 1000-1001. 
52 Kelsen, H., The Law of the United Nations: a critical analysis of its fundamental problems (London: Steven 
& Sons 1950) p 549, cited in Pratap, supra note 26, p 145. 
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This discretion has been repeatedly recognized in several cases before the Court.54 
Nevertheless the Court has declared that as a principal organ of the United Nations system, 
it is duty bound to cooperate with the other organs and consequently obliged in principle to 
answer requests.55 Accordingly, it has stated on a number of occasions that only 
“compelling reasons” could oblige it to forego its duty to reply. The main source of these 
compelling reasons might be the other side of the Court’s character; for not only is the 
Court an organ of the United Nations, but it is also a judicial organ.  
The permissive wording of Article 65 gives the Court a general discretion whether or not to 
answer the question put to it. In addition, Article 68 of the Statute provides that in the 
exercise of its advisory functions the Court shall further be guided by the provisions of the 
Statute which apply in contentious cases “to the extent to which it recognizes them to be 
applicable”.56 
 
In the history of the present Court, there has been no refusal, based on the discretionary 
power of the Court, to act upon a request for advisory opinion. In the case concerning the 
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict,57 the refusal to give 
the World Health Organisation the advisory opinion requested by it, was justified by the 
Court’s lack of jurisdiction in that case, and not because “compelling reasons” were 
present.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
53 Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, 1st Phase, Advisory Opinion 30 
March 1950 (ICJ Reports 1950 p 65) p 72. 
54 See as example Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Advisory Opinion 28 May 1951 (ICJ Reports 1951, p 15), and Certain Expenses of the United 
nations, Advisory Opinion 20 July 1962 (ICJ Reports 1962 p 151). 
55 ICJ Reports 1950 p 65, and Keith, K.J., The Extent of the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court 
of Justice (Leyden: A.W Sijthoff 1971) p 236. 
56 Statute of the Court, Article 68. 
57 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion 8 July 1996 (ICJ 
Reports 1996, p 66). 
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The PCIJ took the view on only one occasion that it could not reply to a question put to it, 
regarding the very particular circumstances of the case, including that the question directly 
concerned an already existing dispute, and one of the States party to this dispute (neither a 
party to the Statute of the PCIJ nor a Member of the League of Nations), objected to the 
proceedings of the second case and refused to take part in any way.58 
3 The Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory case 
3.1  Introduction 
On December 8, 2003, the General Assembly of the United Nations put forward a request 
for an advisory opinion from the ICJ. The question on which the Court was to answer in its 
advisory opinion was set out in resolution ES-10/14 adopted by the General Assembly at its 
Tenth Emergency Special Session.59 The ICJ was requested to render an advisory opinion 
on the following question: 
 
“What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being 
built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
including in and around East Jerusalem, as described in the report of the 
Secretary-General, considering the rules and principles of international law, 
including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant Security Council 
and General Assembly resolutions?” 
 
The Court gave the advisory opinion on July 9, 2004. It came to the conclusion, by fourteen 
votes to one, that the construction of the wall violated international law.60 Israel was under 
an obligation to dismantle it, and pay compensation to Palestinians who had suffered 
financial or property losses as a result of its construction. States should not recognize the 
                                                 
58 Status of Eastern Carelia, 1923.07.23: Advisory Opinion No. 5 (PCIJ, Ser. B., No. 5, 1923). 
59 GA Res. ES-10/14 of 8 December 2003. 
60 See Declaration of Judge Burgenthal in ICJ Reports 2004 p 136. 
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barrier as legitimate and were under an obligation not to render aid or assistance in 
maintaining the situation created by the construction of the wall. Furthermore, the UN 
should act to implement the Court’s decision. 
 
On July 21 2004, the General Assembly of the UN agreed with the ICJ opinion, by a vote 
of 150 – 6 with ten abstentions.61 
 
Prior to delivering the advisory opinion, the Court received 50 written statements from 
various States and organizations. Among these written statements were arguments claiming 
that the Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction, referring inter alia to the Court’s 
discretionary power in Article 65 of the Charter.62  
 
Such a statement was also given by Norway. The Norwegian view on the question whether 
or not the ICJ should render an advisory opinion in this matter, was that such an advisory 
opinion would not contribute to resolving the political differences between the parties in 
the dispute. As far as Norway was concerned, an advisory opinion would not help the 
efforts of the two parties to re-launch a political dialogue and could advance the 
possibilities for a negotiated settlement. Consequently, Norway abstained from voting on 
resolution ES-10/14. So did 74 other countries, while 90 countries supported the resolution 
and 8 countries opposed it.63  
 
I will in the following section summarize the arguments contending that the Court should 
exercise its discretion and refuse to render the advisory opinion concerning the wall built 
                                                 
61 GA Res. ES-10/15 of 20 July 2004. See table 2 in chapter 8.3 for an overview of which States that voted 
against or abstained from voting on this resolution. 
62 See table 1 in chapter 8.2 for an overview of which States and organisations that gave written statements. 
63 Official document from Rolf Einar Fife, on behalf of the Norwegian Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
January 30, 2004. 
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on occupied Palestinian territory. The ICJ examined these arguments in detail in its 
advisory opinion.64  
 
3.2 Summary of the Arguments Contending that the ICJ should Exercise its 
Discretion and Refuse to give the Advisory Opinion 
3.2.1 Determining the Jurisdiction of the Court 
Before the Court can decide whether to use its discretion and refuse to render an advisory 
opinion, it has to determine its jurisdiction.65  
 
The Court found that the General Assembly had the right to request the advisory opinion by 
virtue of Article 65(1) of its Statute and Article 96(1) of the UN Charter, which specifically 
authorizes the General Assembly to request advisory opinions. Consequently the Court 
rejected the argument that it had no jurisdiction in the matter of the wall.66 
 
3.2.2 Lack of Consent 
It was argued that the Court could not exercise its jurisdiction in the present case because 
the request concerned a contentious matter between Israel and Palestine, in which Israel 
had not given consent to the exercise of that jurisdiction.67 
 
However, the Court stated that; one party’s lack of consent to the proceedings does not 
necessarily have a bearing on the Court’s jurisdiction.68 The Court referred to the advisory 
opinion concerning the Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Romania, First Phase, where it was stated that while consent being the basis of the Court’s 
                                                 
64 ICJ Reports 2004 p 136, paras. 46-65. 
65 ICJ Reports 1996 p 232, para. 10. 
66 ICJ Reports 2004 p 136, paras. 14-42. 
67 Ibid, para. 46. 
68 Ibid, para. 47. 
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jurisdiction in contentious proceedings, it is quite different in regard to advisory 
proceedings: 
 
“The Court’s reply is only of an advisory character: as such, it has no binding 
force”. 69 
 
In addition, due to the responsibilities of the UN in matters relating to peace and security 
and the permanent responsibility of the General Assembly regarding the question of 
Palestine until its final resolution, the Court decided that the “radically divergent views” of 
Israel and Palestinians regarding the wall might not be regarded as solely a bilateral matter.  
Lack of consent to the proceedings on Israel’s part therefore was not sufficient to convince 
the Court to decline to issue the advisory opinion.70 
 
3.2.3 Political Implications 
The Court likewise rejected the argument that it should decline to give an advisory opinion 
because of the possible political consequences for a future negotiated solution to the 
conflict. The Court had considered this argument several times before, and it repeated that 
many legal questions have political aspects, but these aspects do not deprive the Court of 
its competence.71 
 
3.2.4 Lack of Information 
It was also contended in the Wall opinion that the question put to the Court only raised one 
aspect of the conflict between Israel and Palestine, and that more information was needed 
for the Court to address the question properly in the proceedings.72 
 
                                                 
69 ICJ Reports 1950 p 71, cited in ICJ Reports 2004 para. 47. 
70 ICJ Reports 2004 p 136, paras. 46-50. 
71 Ibid, paras. 51-53. 
72 Ibid, para. 55. 
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The Court dismissed this argument as it found that it had “sufficient information and 
evidence” as the UN secretary general’s office had submitted several documents 
containing: 
“not only detailed information on the route of the wall but also on its humanitarian 
and socio-economic impact on the Palestinian population.”73  
 
In addition, numerous written statements from other participants were submitted to the 
Court that contained relevant information in order to answer the question put by the 
General Assembly. Although Israel’s written statement was limited to issues of jurisdiction 
and judicial propriety, it contained security concerns and was accompanied by annexes that 
gave more detail to the security argument. Documents concerning these matters were also 
made available to the public. 74 
 
3.2.5 Lack of Useful Purpose 
A further argument was that an advisory opinion given by the ICJ on this question would 
lack any useful purpose.75  
 
As per-long-standing jurisprudence, the Court said, the purpose of advisory opinions is to 
furnish the requesting organs with “the elements of law necessary for them in their 
action”.76 The Court recalled what was stated on this issue in its Opinion on the Legality of 
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: 
 
“(…) it is not for the Court itself to purport to decide whether or not an advisory 
opinion is needed by the Assembly.(…) The General Assembly has the right to 
decide for itself on the usefulness of an opinion in the light of its own needs”.77 
 
                                                 
73 ICJ Reports 2004 p 136, paras. 57-58.  
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid, para. 59. 
76 Ibid, para. 60. 
77 ICJ Reports 1996 p 237, cited in ICJ Reports 2004 p 136, para 61. 
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This statement was found by the Court to be equally relevant in the present proceedings, 
and consequently, the Court could not decline to answer the question based on the grounds 
that its opinion would lack any useful purpose.78 
 
3.2.6 Propriety of Giving the Advisory Opinion 
The Court further dismissed the contention that Palestine was responsible for acts of 
violence and could not seek a remedy from the Court for a situation resulting from its own 
wrongdoing. This was because the advisory opinion is given to the General Assembly and 
not to a specific State or entity.79 
4 The Right of the International Court to Refuse to Render an Advisory 
Opinion  
4.1  Introduction 
The combined case-law of the Permanent Court and the present Court indicates that two 
general principles and the interplay between them have been developed to guide the Court 
in the exercise of its discretion.80 
 
The first is the principle originally laid down in the answer given to the Council of the 
League of Nations by the Permanent Court in the Eastern Carelia advisory opinion, that 
the Court, being a Court of Justice cannot, even in giving advisory opinions, depart from 
the essential rules guiding its activity as a Court.81  
 
                                                 
78 ICJ Reports 2004 p 136, para. 62. 
79 Ibid, para. 63. 
80 Rosenne, supra note 15, p 1013. 
81 PCIJ, Ser. B., No. 5, 1923, p. 29. 
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The second, which is unique to the present Court, is that since the Court is a principal body 
of the United Nations, it is under a duty to cooperate with other bodies, and therefore, a 
request for an advisory opinion should not be refused.82 
 
The Court has in principle stated that it should not refuse to give a requested opinion unless 
there are “compelling reasons” for such a refusal. This view has been confirmed in several 
cases such as the Peace Treaties case,83 the UNESCO case,84 the Expenses case,85 the 
Namibia case,86 the Western Sahara case,87 the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons case,88 and in the Cumaraswamy case.89 In all these cases the Court made it clear 
that it is strongly inclined towards answering a request for an opinion, and that it can refuse 
to give an opinion only if there are ‘compelling reasons’. The Court did not, however, 
identify in any of these cases what those reasons might be.90 
 
I will in the following sections discuss how the arguments put forward in the Wall opinion 
relate to the exercise of the Court’s discretion when deciding if it should refuse to render an 
advisory opinion.  These arguments involved a contention that there existed “compelling 
reasons” for the Court to give an advisory opinion. 
 
The arguments in the Wall opinion involved (i) lack of consent from a State (Israel) to the 
Courts jurisdiction, (ii) lack of requisite facts and evidence, (iii) lack of useful purpose, (iv) 
                                                 
82 Rosenne, supra note 15, p 1013. 
83 ICJ Reports 1950, p 72. 
84 ICJ Reports 1956, pp 86-87. 
85 ICJ Reports 1962, pp 155-156. 
86 ICJ Reports 1971, p 27. 
87 ICJ Reports 1975, p 21. 
88 ICJ Reports 1996, pp 235-236. 
89 ICJ Reports 1999, p 79. 
90 Amr, supra note 41, p 108. 
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complication of negotiations between Israel and Palestine and (v) whether the propriety of 
giving the opinion should lead the Court to refuse to render the opinion. 
 
Because the first argument, lack of consent, has been subject to a wide discussion in several 
previous cases before the Court, I have concentrated most of the analysis on this argument.  
 
4.2  Lack of Consent   
4.2.1 Discretion based on the Court’s Judicial Character 
The first argument the Court examined in the Wall opinion was the lack of consent from 
Israel to the advisory proceedings and the Court’s jurisdiction.91  
 
Several participants in the proceedings raised the argument that the request concerned a 
contentious matter between two States, Israel and Palestine, and that one of these States, 
Israel, had not consented to the exercise of the Courts jurisdiction.92 In addition the parties 
had agreed to settle the dispute by negotiation, with a possibility of settlement through 
arbitration. Furthermore, they argued, the Court should decline to render an advisory 
opinion on the basis inter alia of the precedent of the PCIJ decision on Eastern Carelia.93 
 
The “reply” of the PCIJ in the Eastern Carelia case,94 along with the opinion of the ICJ in 
the Peace Treaty case, 95 are the leading cases on the question of lack of consent, and these 
together with other relevant cases and material will be considered chronologically in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
                                                 
91 ICJ Reports 2004 p 136, paras. 46-50. 
92 See table 1 in chapter 8.2 for an overview of which participants raised this argument. 
93 ICJ Reports 2004 p 136, paras. 46-50. 
94 PCIJ, Ser. B., No. 5, 1923. 
95 ICJ Reports 1950 p 71. 
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4.2.2 Status of Eastern Carelia Advisory Opinion 
The consent of States as parties to a dispute is generally a condition of the Court’s 
jurisdiction in contentious cases. The contention that consent is a requirement for the 
advisory jurisdiction of the Court assumes that the advisory procedure is a judicial 
procedure and this idea rests firmly on the reply of the Eastern Carelia case. This is the 
only case where the PCIJ refused to give an advisory opinion. 
 
The Eastern Carelia opinion concerned the question of whether a certain declaration 
attached to the Treaty of Tartu concluded between Finland and Russia on October 14, 
1920, had the same binding force as the treaty itself. The Court found that this question had 
a direct bearing on the dispute then pending between Finland and Russia which was not at 
that time a Member of the League of Nations and had not agreed either to the request for 
the opinion or to the Court giving it.96 
 
This line of argument is based upon the general principle in international law according to 
which no state is obliged to submit any dispute with another State, or to give an account of 
itself to any international tribunal, and is an outcome of the concept of sovereignty.97 
The Court declared in the Eastern Carelia case that its advisory function must be governed 
by the same fundamental considerations as those governing its function as a judicial 
tribunal in contested cases, which means that its jurisdiction in advisory cases must rest 
upon the consent of the States party to the dispute.98 
 
The reasoning in this case amounted to the Court saying that it ‘could not’ give the opinion, 
for want of jurisdiction in the case, since a State which was vitally concerned, Russia, had 
not consented to this exercise by the Court.99 
 
                                                 
96 PCIJ, Ser. B., No. 5, 1923, p 28, and Pratap, supra note 21, p 154. 
97 Rosenne, supra note 15, p 1014, and PCIJ, Ser. B., No. 5, 1923, p 27. 
98 PCIJ, Ser. B., No. 5, 1923, p 27. 
99 Ibid, p 28. 
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The opinion of the Court was mainly based on the fact that non-participation by Russia in 
the proceedings before the Court would affect its ability to arrive at a judicial conclusion. 
What’s more, the Court seems to have established that its competence to render an opinion 
depended upon its view of the competence of the Council of the League to consider the 
dispute. 100 This was because Russia was not a member of the League of Nations and had 
not given its consent to the solution of the dispute according to the methods provided for in 
the Covenant. The Court found that the submission of a dispute between a State not a 
member of the League and a member State for solution according to the methods provided 
for in the Covenant could take place only by virtue of the consent of both States.101  
 
It can be concluded that the Court’s refusal to reply to the request for an advisory opinion 
was based on the lack of competence on the part of the Council of the League of Nations to 
deal with the dispute. In other words, the reason for the Court declining to answer the 
request for an opinion was not the lack of consent by Russia, but because the Court had 
been asked for an opinion in the context of a dispute settlement procedure which had been 
improperly set in motion in the absence of the consent of Russia, which was not a member 
of the League. The Court was not discussing its own settlement procedure, but was 
concerned with the Council’s settlement procedures laid down in the Covenant:  
 
“As concerns States not members of the League, the situation is quite different; they 
are not bound by the Covenant. The submission, therefore, of a dispute between 
them and a Member of the League for solution according to the methods provided 
for in the Covenant, could take place only by virtue of their consent. Such consent, 
however, has never been given by Russia.”102 
 
In other words, the reasons behind the Court’s refusal to give an advisory opinion were (i) 
Russia’s refusal to give the Court the necessary documents, (ii) the lack of consent of one 
State, which rendered the Council incompetent and the request invalid and thus, indirectly 
                                                 
100 Lauterpacht, H., The Development of International Law by the International Court of Justice (Cambridge: 
Grotius Publications 1982) p 356, Keith, supra note 55, p 94, Amr, supra note 41, p 98.  
101 PCIJ, Ser. B., No. 5, 1923, pp 27-29. 
102 Ibid, pp 27-28. 
 25
affected the competence of the Court. Therefore, the Court found that if it acted and gave 
the opinion, it would be acting ultra vires.103  
 
In the Wall opinion, the argument of lack of consent was based inter alia on the precedent 
of the decision of the PCIJ on the Status of Eastern Carelia. This was because Israel, like 
Russia in the Eastern Carelia case, had not consented to the settlement of the dispute by 
the Court or any other means of compulsory adjudication.104 
Similarly, the Court referred to the Peace Treaty case which answered the question whether 
it should refuse to give an advisory opinion on the basis of the decision on the Status of 
Eastern Carelia. 
 
4.2.3 Peace Treaties Advisory Opinion 
The views expounded in the Peace Treaties case,105 by the present Court, today forms the 
guiding statement on the problem of the relevance and necessity of consent of States party 
to the dispute referred to the Court for an advisory opinion.106 
 
In the Peace Treaties case the Court was asked to give an advisory opinion on certain 
questions relating to the disputes procedure established in the Peace Treaties concluded 
between Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania on the one hand, and the Allied and Associated 
Powers on the other, after the Second World War. There were objections to the competence 
of the Court on the ground that the three States had not consented to the judicial 
proceedings before the Court. In brief statements on this point, the objecting States referred 
to the Eastern Carelia case and to Articles 36 and 68 of the Statute of the Court.107 
 
                                                 
103 Pratap, supra note 26, p 155. 
104 ICJ Reports 2004 p 136, para. 46. 
105 ICJ Reports 1950, p 65. 
106 Rosenne, supra note 15, p 1014. 
107 ICJ Reports 1950, p 71. 
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In the Peace Treaties case the Court held that it was competent to give the opinion and that 
“it [was] under a duty to do so”.108 It acknowledged that consent of States party to a 
dispute is the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction in contentious cases, but this was not so in 
advisory proceedings, even where the request relates to a legal question actually pending 
between States. The ICJ gave the following grounds for this point of view: 
 
“The Court’s reply is only of an advisory character: as such, it has no binding force. 
It follows that no State, whether a member of the United Nations or not, can prevent 
the giving of an Advisory Opinion which the United Nations considers to be desirable 
in order to obtain enlightenment as to the course of action it should take.”109 
 
The Court’s statements in this case apparently abandoned the principle laid down in the 
Eastern Carelia case when stating that consent of States, affected by a request or involved 
in a dispute to which that request relates, is not necessary for the Court to be able to give 
the opinion.110 It said: 
 
“The objection [that is, the objection on the grounds of non-consent] reveals a 
confusion between the principles governing contentious jurisdiction and those 
which are applicable to Advisory Opinions 
The consent, parties to a dispute, is the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction in 
contentious cases. The situation is different in regard to advisory proceedings even 
where the Request for an Opinion relates to a legal question actually pending 
between States”111  
 
The Court indicated that its obligation to give an opinion was not absolute or unlimited, 
and in considering whether there was any reason why the Court should desist from giving 
the opinion, the Court distinguished the Peace Treaties case from the Eastern Carelia case 
by saying that: 
 
                                                 
108 ICJ Reports 1950 p71. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Pratap, supra note 26, p 157. 
111 ICJ Reports 1950 p 71. 
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“There are certain limits, however, to the Court’s duty to reply to a Request for an 
Opinion. It is not merely an ‘organ of the United Nations’, it is essentially the 
‘principal judicial organ’ of the Organization.”112 
 
Put simply, the challenge here was the limits to the Court’s duty to participate in the 
organisation of the UN as one of its principal organs. The Court then explained the purport 
of Article 65 of the Statute: 
 
“Article 65 of the Statute is permissive. It gives the Court the power to examine 
whether the circumstances of the case are of such a character as should lead it to 
decline to answer the Request. (…) the circumstances of the present case are 
profoundly different from those which were before the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in the Eastern Carelia case when that Court declined to give an 
Opinion because it found that the question would be substantially equivalent to 
deciding the dispute between the parties, and at the same time it raised a question of 
fact which could not be elucidated without hearing both parties. 
As has been observed, the present Request for an Opinion is solely concerned with 
the applicability to certain disputes of the procedure for settlement instituted by the 
Peace Treaties, and is justifiable to conclude that it in no way touches the merits of 
those disputes.”113 
 
The Court held that the reasons which lead the Permanent Court to refuse to reply were not 
relevant to the case before it. Having determined that it is competent to answer the request, 
the Court mentions Eastern Carelia in its consideration of how it would exercise its 
discretion. The Court is here solely concerned with the “other reasons” which make it 
“very inexpedient” for the Permanent Court to give an opinion in the Eastern Carelia 
case.114 In other words the Court was then not concerned with the effect of non-consent on 
its competence, but with the effect giving an opinion would have on its ability to remain 
faithful to its judicial character and on the exercise of its discretion under Article 65 of its 
Statute.115  
 
                                                 
112 ICJ Reports 1950 p 72. 
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114 PCIJ, Ser. B., No. 5, 1923, p 28. 
115 Keith, supra note 55, p 115. 
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It has been stated that the Peace Treaties case confirms the argument put forward in 
relation to Eastern Carelia case: the consent or otherwise of States party to a dispute which 
has been referred to the Court for an advisory opinion has no direct effect on the Court’s 
advisory competence.116 Lack of consent may render the requesting organ incompetent and, 
if this is the case, then the Court will, according to the Eastern Carelia case, refuse to give 
an opinion. If, however, the request is made in the course of a valid consideration of the 
issue, as it was in the Peace Treaties case, then the Court is competent regardless of the 
non-consent of interested States to reply to any legal question.117 
 
Additionally, the absence of a State’s consent has no effect upon the Court’s advisory 
jurisdiction even when the request relates to an inter-state dispute. As noted above, the 
Court based its view on the nature of the advisory opinion, which has no binding force 
upon the interested States. It also pointed out that these opinions are given directly to the 
requesting organ and not to the States concerned. Finally, it stated that: 
 
“…no State, whether a Member of the United nations or not, can prevent the giving 
of an Advisory Opinion which the United nations considers to be desirable in order 
to obtain enlightenment as to the course of action it should take.”118 
 
In the Wall opinion the ICJ reiterated the principle laid down in the Peace Treaties opinion 
that lack of consent to the contentious jurisdiction of the Court has no bearing on the 
Court’s jurisdiction to give advisory opinions.119 However, in the Peace Treaties case the 
Court examined the opposition of certain interested states to the request by the General 
Assembly in the context of judicial propriety.120 The Court points out that issues of judicial 
propriety are therefore relevant to consider also in the Wall opinion, even though lack of 
consent by interested States does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. 
                                                 
116 See the arguments in Keith, supra note 55, pp 115-117. 
117 Ibid. 
118 ICJ Reports 1950 p 71. 
119 ICJ Reports 2004 p 136, para. 47. 
120 Ibid. 
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4.2.4 Reservations Advisory Opinion 
In the Reservations to the Convention on Genocide advisory opinion,121 it was argued that 
since the request related to a dispute between States, the Court should decline to give an 
opinion. Furthermore, the lodging of an objection or a reservation made by a State to the 
Convention constituted a dispute. In order to avoid adjudicating on that dispute the Court 
should refrain from replying to the first two questions.122 The Court did not, however, 
accede to the view that the mere existence of a dispute between individual States on the 
matter ought to lead it to refuse to give an opinion, and referred to its views on the Peace 
Treaty case in the following words: 
 
“In this connection, the Court can confine itself to recalling the principles which it 
laid down in its Opinion of March 30th 1950 (ICJ Reports 1950 p. 71). A reply to a 
request for an Opinion should not, in principle, be refused. The permissive provision 
of Article 65 of the Statute recognises that the Court has power to decide whether the 
circumstances of a particular case are such as to lead the Court to decline to reply to 
the request for an Opinion. At the same time, Article 68 of the Statute recognises that 
the Court has the power to decide to what extent the circumstances of each case must 
lead it to apply to advisory proceedings the provisions of the Statute which apply in 
contentious cases.123 
 
The Court went on to note that the object of the request was to guide the United Nations in 
respect of its own actions. The General Assembly which drafted and adopted the Genocide 
Convention, and the Secretary-General, who was the depository of the instrument of 
ratification and accession, had an interest in knowing the legal effects of reservations to 
that Convention and more particularly the legal effects of objections to such reservations.124 
The legal opinion of the Peace Treaties case was consequently reiterated in the 
Reservations case. The Court concluded that the principle of consent of the disputant 
                                                 
121 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory 
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parties is not relevant to its advisory jurisdiction. Thus it was confirmed that a reply to a 
request for an advisory opinion should not be refused according to this challenge.125 
 
Compared to the Reservations case, the argument of lack of consent in the Wall opinion 
involves the fact that the question concerns a “contentious matter” between Israel and 
Palestine. 126 As in the Reservations case, the Court refers to the Peace Treaties case when 
giving its reasons why it chooses not to use its discretionary power in the Wall opinion. In 
addition, the Court notes that Israel and Palestine do have radically divergent views on the 
question concerned, but, referring to another previous case, states that: 
 
“Differences of views…on legal issues have existed in practically every advisory 
proceeding.”127 
 
In other words, a dispute between States does not limit the Court’s jurisdiction, even when 
there is lack of consent from one of these States to the advisory jurisdiction of the Court. 
 
4.2.5 Western Sahara Advisory Opinion 
The ICJ extensively examined the issue of lack of consent in the Western Sahara case.128  
 
This case concerned the question of whether the territory of Western Sahara was terra 
nullius at the time of its colonization by Spain. It was also asked what the legal ties were 
between Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity. 
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In the Western Sahara case Spain argued that the ICJ was incompetent to deal with the 
matter because it did not give its consent to the Court, and because both Morocco and 
Mauritania were using the advisory jurisdiction of the Court to circumvent the principle of 
consent to adjudication.129  
 
The ICJ pointed out that in contrast to the Eastern Carelia case, where Russia was neither a 
member of the League nor party to the PCIJ’s statute Spain, as a member of the UN, had 
accepted the Charter and the Statute, whereby it had in general given prior consent to the 
exercise of the Court’s advisory jurisdiction.130 Moreover, the Court noted that the question 
was related mainly to the possibility of the application of the General Assembly’s 
resolutions. Therefore, the Court stated that the aim of this question was to assist the 
Assembly in fulfilling its functions, namely the decolonisation of the territories.131 
Furthermore, the Court found that Spain, unlike Russia in the Eastern Carelia case, had 
actively participated in the advisory opinion proceedings before the Court and “furnished 
very extensive documentary evidence of the facts”.132 Consequently, there was no issue of 
“inadequacy of the evidence”, as in Eastern Carelia, operating “for reasons of judicial 
propriety”, to prevent the Court from giving an opinion.133 
 
The Court refers directly to the Western Sahara case in the Wall opinion, repeating a 
statement saying that lack of consent might constitute a reason for declining to give the 
requested opinion, if considerations of judicial propriety are present.134 Lack of consent of 
an interested State may render the giving of an advisory opinion incompatible with the 
Court’s judicial character, if it would have the effect of circumventing the principle of 
consent from States before referring the dispute to judicial settlement. The Court does not 
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regard this fact to be present in the Wall case, and therefore does not see it as a “compelling 
reason” to refuse to answer the request.135 
 
Moreover, the Court compares the Western Sahara case to the Wall opinion, saying that the 
Court found a legal controversy to exist in the former case, but that this “dispute” had not 
arisen independently in bilateral relations. The legal controversy had arisen during the 
proceedings of the General Assembly and in relation to matters with which the Assembly 
was dealing. In the Wall opinion, the Court acknowledges that there are divergent views 
between the parties, but this is common for all advisory proceedings before the Court. In 
addition, the Court points out that the Israel - Palestine conflict cannot be regarded as only 
a bilateral dispute, but is of direct concern to the whole of the UN. In other words, the 
Court is saying that answering a request for an advisory opinion in the case concerning the 
wall will not be equivalent to circumventing the principle of consent when submitting a 
dispute to judicial settlement. This is because the dispute in question is located in a much 
broader frame of reference than a bilateral dispute.136 
 
4.2.6 Discretion based on the Court’s Character as a Principal Organ of the UN  
The Court has made clear that as a principal organ of the UN, it should normally give 
opinions on a legal question when asked to do so by a competent organ or specialized 
agency of the UN. Thus, in the Peace Treaties case the Court said that the permissive 
wording of Article 65 gives the Court a large amount of discretion when examining 
whether a request for an advisory opinion should be declined.137 
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More recently, in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons opinion,138 the 
Court, citing statements in several previous cases, stated that only ‘compelling reasons’ 
should lead it to refuse to give an opinion when requested to do so by a competent organ. 
Such ‘compelling reasons’ have not been found to exist in the previous cases before the 
Court, although the PCIJ declined to render an opinion in the Eastern Carelia case.139 
 
There is no doubt that the wording of Article 65 of the Statute gives the Court a 
discretionary power to reply to requests for advisory opinions. However, the discretion of 
the Court seems inconsistent with the position of the ICJ within the framework of the UN, 
where its special position imposes upon it an obligation to co-operate with the UN organs 
and its specialized agencies.  
 
This obligation can be justified on the basis of the organisational relationship between the 
Court and the UN, whereby the Court is considered to be the judicial arm of the UN, and its 
opinions of great importance to UN organs in clarifying the legal norms in issues before 
them. 
 
As noted by Amr, a senior lecturer of Public International Law at Cairo University, and 
currently Deputy Permanent Delegate of Egypt to UNESCO in Paris, writes in his book 
“The Role of the International Court of Justice as the Principal Judicial Organ of the 
United Nations”, that several advocates have suggested that the above arguments should 
lead to the conclusion that the Court has no discretionary power with regard to its advisory 
jurisdiction.140 Because the refusal of the ICJ to give a judgement in contentious cases is 
considered a ‘denial of justice’, this attribute, extended and applied here, is analogous to 
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the Court refusing to give an advisory opinion to the requesting organ, since there is no 
difference in jurisdiction.141 
 
Additionally, it has been observed that this point of view cannot rely on the legal opinion in 
the Eastern Carelia case, as there are significant differences between the position of the 
PCIJ as a non-organ of the League of Nations and the position of the ICJ as the principal 
judicial organ of the UN.142 This is also based on the Court’s dictum in the Peace Treaty 
case when the Court remarked that: 
 
“there are certain limits to the Court’s duty to reply to advisory opinions. It is not 
merely an organ of the United Nations, it is essentially the ‘principal judicial 
organ’ of the organisations”.143 
 
Accordingly, the discretion of the ICJ is not absolute, but is restricted by the overriding 
principle of the Court’s duty as a principal organ of the United Nations.144  
 
On several occasions the Court has commented that it considers itself to be under an 
obligation to participate in the activities of the UN. The giving of an advisory opinion is 
regarded as such participation, and should in principle, not be refused by the Court unless 
there are “compelling reasons” for such a refusal.145  
In the Wall advisory opinion, the Court regards the subject of the request not only as a 
bilateral matter between Israel and Palestine. It says that: 
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“Given the powers and responsibilities of the United Nations in questions relating 
to international peace and security, it is the Court’s view that the construction of 
the wall must be deemed to be directly of concern to the United Nations.”146 
 
As the request is regarded to be within the responsibilities of the United Nations, the Court 
argues that the object of the request is for the Court to give assistance to the General 
Assembly in the proper exercise of its functions.147 
 
Such assistance is one of the main functions of the ICJ as the principal judicial organ 
within the UN, and as noted above, should in principle not be refused, unless “compelling 
reasons” say otherwise. 
 
4.2.7 Conclusion 
A distinguished professor of law and a former judge at the ICJ, Sir Hersch Lautherpacht, 
points out that if the consent of litigant States is a required condition for the ICJ to give an 
advisory opinion, it means that these states can hinder the interested organ from requesting 
an opinion from the ICJ.148 Consequently, the work of UN bodies would be impeded, and 
the advisory function of the ICJ, which is one of its main functions, could be diminished. It 
has also been stated by Lauterpacht, that, by giving the Court the general power to render 
advisory opinions, the members of the UN agree to its advisory jurisdiction on any legal 
question whether it involves their interests or not. The Statute of the Court being an integral 
part of the UN Charter also undermines this argument. 
 
Furthermore, Lauterpacht notes that there should be no decisive reason why the sovereignty 
of States should be protected from the procedure, to which they have consented in advance 
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as members of the UN, of ascertaining the law through a pronouncement that is non 
binding.149 
 
In conclusion, the consent of litigant States today is not considered by the Court to be an 
appropriate condition for requesting an advisory opinion from the ICJ with regard to inter-
state disputes. The Court is quite clearly not prevented from acting judicially by the mere 
fact that an interested State has not consented to the proceedings. Accordingly, UN organs 
may bring any matter relating to an existing dispute between States before the ICJ for an 
advisory opinion.150 
 
However, even though the Court has set aside the principle of consent of States as the basis 
of its jurisdiction in advisory cases relating to disputes, the issue of consent as a question of 
propriety seems to have been left unaffected.151 The Court has recognized that in: 
 
“certain circumstances . . . the lack of consent of an interested State may render the 
giving of an advisory opinion incompatible with the Court’s judicial character. An 
instance of this would be when the circumstances disclose that to give a reply would 
have the effect of circumventing the principle that a State is not obliged to allow its 
disputes to be submitted to judicial settlement without its consent”.152 
 
There are several situations which might give rise to issues of propriety. However, it will 
depend on the circumstances of the case involved whether the Court should decline to 
answer the question on which the opinion is requested. It is entirely up to the powers of the 
Court to decide whether such circumstances exist. 
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Consequently, the Court can still find lack of consent as a compelling reason to refuse to 
give an advisory opinion. This can be the case where absence of consent affects the 
availability of relevant material.153 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the Court today makes a distinction between issues of 
general principle and the decision of specific disputes, and the need to advise UN organs on 
legal issues and the binding of disputing States. The Court’s advisory jurisdiction does not 
settle disputes, but its purpose is to assist the requesting organ to reach a solution or adopt a 
resolution. During the formulation of the Charter, there was never the intention of 
restricting the Court’s advisory jurisdiction to purely non-contentious situations.154 
 
As mentioned in chapter 4.2.6, there have been some objections to the PCIJ dictum in the 
Eastern Carelia case as an irrelevant precedent because the organisation of the 
international community has advanced since the time of this case, so that a non-member of 
the UN cannot argue its non-membership as a challenge to the advisory jurisdiction of the 
Court. The Court’s legal opinion seems to support this view in several cases.155 
 
4.3  Lack of Facts 
A further argument in the Wall opinion contending that the Court should exercise its 
discretion and refuse to render the advisory opinion, was that the Court did not have the 
requisite facts and evidence to enable it to reach a judicial conclusion. This argument was 
in particular raised by Israel, stating that: 
 
“(…) the Court could not give an opinion on issues which raise questions of fact that 
cannot be elucidated without hearing all parties to the conflict”.156 
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A Court should, generally speaking be in possession of all material which is relevant to its 
proper consideration of the case and to its decision according to law. In its advisory 
proceedings the ICJ has always been concerned to see that it had such access. The question 
is whether the Court has sufficient information to enable it, as a judicial body, to give an 
answer to the request. Where the question posed cannot be answered without certain factual 
determinations and the material before the Court does not permit a properly judicial 
conclusion regarding those facts, this can be one factor which the Court can conclude to be 
such a ‘compelling reason’ as to lead it to refuse to give the requested opinion.157  
 
The question in the Eastern Carelia case, was in the opinion of the Court, a ‘question of 
fact’.158 After deciding that it was impossible for the Court to reply, the Court gave reasons 
which rendered it “very inexpedient” for it to reply: 
 
“The question whether Finland and Russia contracted on the terms of the 
Declaration as to the nature of the autonomy of Eastern Carelia is really one of fact. 
To answer it would involve the duty of ascertaining what evidence might throw light 
upon the contentions which have been put forward on this subject by Finland and 
Russia respectively, and of securing the attendance of such witnesses as might be 
necessary. The Court would of course, be at a very great disadvantage in such an 
enquiry, owing to the fact that Russia refuses to take part in it. It appears to be very 
doubtful whether there would be available to the Court materials sufficient to enable 
it to arrive at any judicial conclusion upon the question of fact.”159 
 
The Court thus makes it very clear that as a judicial body it must be in possession of all 
relevant material, including, at least in some cases, material from both parties. If the Court 
is unable, because of lack of material, to give full and proper consideration to the request it 
will, as a judicial body, feel obliged to decline to reply.160  
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The ILOAT advisory opinion dealt with the matter of the judgments of the Administrative 
Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) upon complaints made against the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).161 In this 
case the Court acknowledged that:  
 
“The judicial character of the Court requires that both sides directly affected by 
these proceedings should be in a position to submit their views and their arguments 
to the Court. The principle of the equality of the parties follows from the 
requirements of the good administration of justice”.162 
 
After deciding that the parties were in a position of equality, even though no oral 
proceedings were held, the Court came to the conclusion that it was satisfied that adequate 
information had been made available to it. There was, therefore, no compelling reason why 
the Court should refuse to reply.163 
 
The Court reiterated this statement in the Western Sahara case, when it observed that 
extensive documentary evidence of the relevant facts had been provided, and considered 
this to be sufficient information for the Court to deliver its opinion.164 Even so, it was 
stated by the Court in this case that what is decisive in these circumstances is: 
 
“whether the Court has before it sufficient information and evidence to enable it to 
arrive at a judicial conclusion upon any disputed question of fact the determination 
of which is necessary for it to give an opinion in conditions compatible with its 
judicial character.”165 
 
The Rules of Court requires requests to be accompanied by all documents likely to throw 
light on the question. The Court has also had the practice of inviting States and 
                                                 
161 Judgements of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon Complaints Made against Unesco, Advisory 
Opinion 23 October 1956 (ICJ Reports 1956 pp 77). 
162 Ibid, p 86. 
163 Ibid. 
164 ICJ Reports 1975 p 37. 
165 Ibid pp 28-29, also referred to in ICJ Reports 2004 p 136, para. 56. 
 40
international organisations to present both written and oral arguments prior to looking at 
the case in question. In giving interested States and organisations this opportunity the Court 
ensures that it has sufficient information on which to base its opinion. Thus, a State 
contending that the Court does not have the requisite information to render the advisory 
opinion may have difficulty being heard by the Court as all States have the opportunity to 
supply the Court with the relevant facts they find to be necessary. 
 
The obligation of the requesting organs to forward all relevant documents and the 
opportunity of interested States and organisations to present arguments and information 
ensures in most cases that the Court has all necessary information.166  
 
In the Wall opinion, the Court regards itself to have sufficient information and evidence to 
enable it to give the requested opinion. The Court refers to the report of the Secretary-
General and a voluminous dossier submitted by him to the Court. There are also written 
statements updating the Secretary-General’s report, and written statements from other 
participants, including Israel’s statement and documents issued by the Israeli Government 
which are in the public domain.167 
In addition, the court notes that even though others may evaluate and interpret the 
information submitted to Court in a subjective or political manner, this cannot be an 
argument or be regarded as a compelling reason for the Court to decline to give the 
requested opinion.168  
 
4.4 Lack of Useful Purpose 
Furthermore, it was argued in the Wall opinion that the Court should decline the request for 
an advisory opinion because such an opinion would lack any useful purpose.169 
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It has been suggested that the Court should use its discretion if it is of the view that 
rendering an opinion will not help solve the problem which gave rise to the request. This 
argument can be accepted only in one very limited case: where the Court held that a 
particular request could lead to an opinion which had no useful purpose. This can be where 
the Court is asked a question which it holds as irrelevant to the disposition of the problem 
facing the requesting body.170 Thus, if the Court finds that its opinion would be ineffective 
or without purpose, this could be regarded as a ‘compelling reason’ to refuse to answer the 
request.171  
 
This was implicitly stated in the Northern Cameroons case,172 and in the Nuclear Tests 
cases.173 In the former case, the Court stated that: 
 
“the function of the Court is to state the law, but it may pronounce judgement only 
in connection with concrete cases where there exists at the time of the adjudication 
an actual controversy involving a conflict of legal interests between the parties. The 
Court’s judgement must have some practical consequence in the sense that it can 
affect existing legal rights or obligations of the parties, thus removing uncertainty 
from their legal relations. No judgement on the merits in this case could satisfy 
these essentials of the judicial function.”174 
 
In the Wall opinion it was argued by several States that the General Assembly would not 
need an opinion from the Court because it had already declared the construction of the wall 
to be illegal and determined the legal consequences by demanding that Israel stop and 
reverse its construction. More specifically, it is here argued that the opinion sought would 
not be of clarification of the law which could be expected to assist the requesting organ, the 
General Assembly.175 Accordingly, the opinion would be ineffective and without purpose. 
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This argument has also been raised in previous cases before the ICJ.  
 
It is highly unlikely that the Court, which considers itself to be under obligation to 
cooperate with other organs of the UN, would hold the request to be without purpose. 
 
However, except for in very limited circumstances, as mentioned above, the proposition 
that the Court should determine the likely value of the opinion cannot be accepted without 
argument. 
 
First, the relevant political organ, after considering the matter which gave rise to the 
request, presumably has judged by the appropriate majority and following its own 
procedures, that it would be valuable to have the opinion of the principal judicial organ of 
the UN system on some legal issue.  
 
Determining the possible value of an advisory opinion before it is given, is difficult and  
would involve an assessment of how the requesting organ and interested States are going to 
act in the future.  
Sir Kenneth James Keith, a New Zealand judge appointed to the ICJ in November 2005, 
mentioned this procedure for his Masters of Laws, published in 1971. Keith calls 
determining the value of advisory opinions for “guesswork”, and notes that the body which 
made the request, and will later act upon it, is the body best qualified to make such a 
guess.176 The requesting body can always withdraw the request, if second thoughts occur. 
 
Second, such an assessment would put the Court in an awkward position, as it would have 
to judge and predict the likely action of political organs and States. 
 
These arguments suggest a third major objection: whether an opinion is likely to be 
acceptable depends on the content of the opinion. In other words, the Court would not 
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generally be able to enter into speculation until it has reached its substantive conclusion, 
and speculation at that point would be highly discriminatory: if the Court’s substantive 
conclusions impose a minimum of obligations on States or it recognises minimal powers in 
the organisation they are much more likely to be accepted than an opinion to the opposite 
effect. It would presumably follow that the Court should have given the second opinion. 
Such inequality conflicts with a basic concept of the judicial process.177  
 
Fourth, the argument would generally be difficult to reconcile with the obligation of the 
Court as an organ of the UN to cooperate with other organs.  
 
Finally, the Court should generally not be concerned with the possible effects of its 
decisions.178 
 
The arguments mentioned above seem to be the basis for the Court’s conclusion in the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case, where the Court declined to inquire 
into the purpose for which an opinion was requested: 
 
“(…) it is not for the Court itself to purport to decide whether or not an advisory 
opinion is needed by the Assembly for the performance of its functions. The General 
Assembly has the right to decide for itself on the usefulness of an opinion in the 
light of its own needs.”179 
 
The Court reiterated this statement in the Wall opinion and concluded that it cannot decline 
to answer the question posed based on the grounds that the opinion would not have any 
useful purpose.180 
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However, one could imagine a situation where there are good reasons for the Court to 
consider that its opinion would not be of positive assistance and that it might even be 
detrimental to the work of the UN if it were to render the opinion. Even so, it is submitted 
that the Court would only in very exceptional circumstances use its discretion to refuse to 
comply with its duty to reply to a request for an opinion if it can do so while remaining 
faithful to its judicial character and its obligation to act judicially.  
 
4.5  Complicated Negotiations or Political Implications 
A further argument in the Wall opinion presented as to the propriety of the exercise of the 
Court’s judicial function was that an advisory opinion on this matter could impede and 
complicate a political, negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.181  
 
If the Court considers that an opinion would be unlikely to assist the requesting organ and, 
if it considers that rendering an opinion would have an adverse effect of the work of the 
UN as a whole, this might constitute a compelling reason for the Court to decline to give 
the requested opinion. The Court might find that giving an opinion could complicate the 
matter or create difficulties for another part of the UN in carrying out its responsibilities.182 
 
The purpose of the UN is to maintain international peace and security, and to take such 
collective measures to prevent and remove threats to peace. It also plays a key role in trying 
to achieve international co-operation in resolving international problems.183 
The contention that an advisory opinion on the legality of the wall and the legal 
consequences of its construction could complicate a negotiated solution is based on the 
view that this would be contrary to the work of the UN, as its main function is to promote 
such negotiated solutions and settlement. 
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However, the Court has stated that it is difficult to predict the possible effects of an 
advisory opinion and to make clear what influence an opinion might have on the specific 
negotiations in a conflict.184 
 
It seems as though the Court does not consider an advisory opinion to have a negative 
effect in such a matter. On the contrary, as the Court pointed out in the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case, it can be an additional element in the negotiations: 
 
“Beyond that, the effect of the opinion is a matter of appreciation.”185 
 
The Court concludes in the Wall opinion, that it does not regard this factor as a compelling 
reason to decline to exercise its jurisdiction.186 
 
4.6 Propriety of Giving Advisory Opinions 
Finally, it is argued that good faith and the principle of “clean hands” provide a compelling 
reason that should lead the Court to refuse the General Assembly’s request.187 The 
argument contains an assertion that Palestine is responsible for acts of violence, and that 
the wall is built as protection for the Israeli population. Because of this, Palestine cannot 
seek a remedy for a situation resulting from its own wrongdoing.188 
 
This argument has not been put forward in previous cases before the ICJ, and the Court did 
not find it to be relevant in the Wall case, as the advisory opinion is not given to Palestine 
or Israel, but to the requesting organ, which in this case is the General Assembly. The prior 
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actions of the parties involved can therefore not be regarded as compelling reasons for the 
Court to exercise its discretion.  
5 The Legal Effect of Advisory Opinions 
5.1 The Non-Binding Effect of Advisory Opinions 
It is an established view that the advisory opinions of the ICJ are not binding upon the 
requested organs and consequently there is no obligation upon them to follow the Court’s 
advice.189 This view is founded in the different function of advisory opinions and 
judgements, whereas advisory opinions are regarded as “advisory”. Thus, the binding effect 
of the Court is limited to the Court’s judgements.  
 
However, the advisory opinions of the ICJ may be prescribed with a binding effect in 
advance by the international instrument concerned, other than the Charter and the Statute. 
Such provisions are known as “advisory arbitration”, or “advisory opinion with binding 
force”, or “compulsive effect” opinions.190 The common feature of these provisions is that 
they characterise the opinion requested of the Court as a “decision” in relation to the 
dispute at issue.191 In practice, numerous institutions within the UN system have adopted 
this provision in their instruments. For instance, article 8, section 21(b) of the Headquarters 
Agreement between the UN and USA indicates that the Court’s opinion has a binding 
effect upon the requesting organ.192 
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In addition, States may agree in advance that the Court’s advisory opinion with regard to a 
special matter will be binding upon them. So far, there has been no instance of such 
agreement in the UN era.193 
 
In the above two cases, the Court’s opinions are binding upon the organisations and 
concerned States. This effect is based on the prior consent of the organisation or concerned 
States.194 
 
Even so, unless there is a specific provision giving these opinions binding effect, the 
established view, as mentioned above, is that the Court’s opinions are not binding.  
 
Despite the fact that practice has shown that the organs and agencies concerned have 
faithfully followed the Court’s opinions, it should be stressed that the refusal to respect an 
advisory opinion might impair and diminish the authority of the Court as a legal adviser in 
public opinion.195 In addition to this view, it has also been noted that although advisory 
opinions are not thought to be binding in a technical and formal sense, their persuasive 
character and substantive authority are considerable.196 This is because they are judicial 
‘pronouncements’ of the highest international tribunal and statements of law contained in 
them are of the same high quality as those contained in judgements.197 Accordingly, 
advocates making this argument conclude that the requesting organ would not be in a very 
good position before the world if it paid no attention to the Court’s opinion. 
 
So far, no organ has taken action directly contrary to any advisory opinion given by the 
ICJ. On the contrary, the Court’s opinions have been received and respected by the 
                                                 
193 Amr, supra not 41, p 113. 
194 Ibid, p 113. 
195 Ibid, p 120. 
196 Pratap, supra note 26, p 231. 
197 Ibid, Amr, supra note 41, p 111, Hudson, M., The Effect of Advisory Opinions of the World Court, AJIL, 
42, 1948, p 630. 
 48
organs.198 This attitude shows to what extent the Court’s opinions have an effect upon these 
organs. 
 
5.2 The Effect of the Wall opinion 
In the Wall opinion the ICJ answered the call to unravel a part of the enormous legal tangle 
of the situation in the Middle East by rendering its advisory opinion on the construction of 
a security barrier. The Court was united in most of its findings, though one judge 
maintained that the Court should have declined to exercise its jurisdiction in this case for 
lack of sufficient information and evidence.199 However, by his own admission, he agreed 
with what the Court actually said on many points of law.200 
 
Andrea Bianchi, a professor of International Law at the Graduate Institute of International 
Studies in Geneva, noted in one article regarding the Wall opinion, that the ICJ in this case 
unequivocally manifested its intention to be an actor in the process of providing guidance 
and directing change during an uncertain period for the international community.201 
 
Biancchi regards the relevance of this advisory opinion not to lie within the political 
significance for the situation in the Middle East, but rather in the stances taken by the Court 
on the many topical issues of general international law, which may also have an impact in 
other contexts.202 The Court has in numerous cases dealt with highly sensitive political 
issues, both in its contentious and advisory jurisdiction. Its findings have often had a more 
general impact for international law and its development, going beyond the contingencies 
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of the particular case in question.203 It suffices here to mention the intervention in 
Nicaragua,204 or the issue of the Legality of the Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons case.205  
 
The fact that the Court has never declined to exercise its jurisdiction on the ground of the 
political character of the legal questions submitted to it, in both contentious cases and 
advisory opinions, shows the determination by the Court not to avoid taking a stance on 
heavily-charged issues of international politics. The Court has adopted a broad concept of 
the term “legal questions” and has not found that political motives or even the drafting of 
the question in abstract terms to limit its responsibility in this regard.206 As long as a certain 
issue can be characterized as legal, the underlying policy issues have never prevented the 
Court from discharging its judicial function. As Professor Brownlie put it; “political issues 
do not cease to be such because they are also legal issues”.207  
 
The Wall opinion rendered by the ICJ can be seen as yet another example of how, at times, 
the law can be inextricably linked to politics.208 
The nearly unanimous stance taken by the judges in the Wall opinion should not be 
underestimated. It attests to their perception of both the importance of the underlying legal 
issues and, most of all, the need to speak with one voice, thus providing guidance not just 
to the requesting body but also to the international community as a whole.209 However, 
whether or not the Court succeeded in conveying to the outside world such an impression is 
open to question. 
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In addition, all the other organs of the UN had already expressed their views within their 
respective fields of competence.210 This adds further emphasis to the symbolic and practical 
value of the Court’s opinion. 
6 Extension of the Jurisdiction of the ICJ 
 
Various possibilities for expansion of the Court’s role have been suggested, and several of 
these directly concern the Court’s role in relation to international organisations.  
There is an obvious need for international dispute settlement procedures, and the 
possibilities of using the ICJ to meet this need have been considered, either by extending 
the use of the advisory opinion, or, in an even more radical proposal, by giving to the UN, 
and perhaps other specialized agencies, direct standing to sue, or be sued, as a party. 211 
 
Extending the Right to Request an Advisory Opinion 
6.1 Secretary General 
The Secretary General is the only principal organ of the UN that has not been authorised by 
the General Assembly to request an advisory opinion of the ICJ. 
 
The Court’s opinion may be of direct relevance to the work of the Secretary General. 
However, the argument of giving the power of request to the Secretary General 
presupposes that neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly is prepared to 
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make the request. In such circumstances it would seem likely that the Secretary General 
lacks the political support of one or both main political organs. The granting of the power 
could therefore seem to increase the risk of conflict between the Secretary General and the 
other main organs of the UN, the Security Council and the General Assembly. This may be 
too high a price to pay for the advantage gained.212 
 
6.2 States 
The practise of giving States the right to request an opinion is already accepted in the 
European Communities.213 
 
This suggestion has its attractions as States frequently face questions where they are unsure 
of their position under international law. Newer, smaller States may not have experienced 
legal advisors in their Foreign Offices who can give the necessary advice with confidence. 
However, there could be drawbacks. Such a ‘free legal advice’ service might prove to be so 
attractive that it would greatly increase the Court’s workload. 
 
Furthermore, the Eastern Carelia principle would have to apply: if the question raised with 
the Court involved an actual pending dispute with another State, it would be quite wrong 
for the Court to advise one party without hearing the other party, and receiving its 
consent.214 
 
6.3 Greater Use of the ‘Compulsive’ or ‘Binding’ Advisory Opinion 
This technique of giving what is prima facie a purely advisory opinion, a binding character, 
is well established. It has been used in several treaties on privileges and immunities, 
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headquarters agreements, and other UN treaties.215 In all such cases the ‘binding’ character 
of the opinion derives from some instrument other than the opinion or the Court’s Statute. 
Thus, in theory, the technique could be extended by adopting more instruments 
incorporating this device. However, the purpose of this devise is to compensate for the lack 
of direct standing of international organizations before the Court. It is noted by several 
advocates supporting the extension of the jurisdiction of the ICJ, that the problem instead 
should be faced directly, conferring such standing on international organizations.216 
 
6.4 The Granting of locus standi to International Organisations 
The Court’s advisory role is significant in assisting the UN organs and agencies to decide 
issues with legal dimensions before them. It seems therefore that there should be no reason 
for the General Assembly to exercise its discretion as to who should and should not have 
this power. The expansion of the scope of the organs and agencies authorised by the 
General Assembly to request advisory opinions was considered an improvement in the 
early stages of the establishment of the International Court.217 Accordingly, a further step 
should be taken to authorise all UN organs, agencies and subsidiary organs to have direct 
power without the need for authorisation from any other organ within the UN. 
This suggestion would help to avoid any disagreement regarding the right of some organs 
or agencies to have such a power. It might also help to avoid any possibility of revocation 
of this authority by the General Assembly at its discretion.218 
 
 
                                                 
215 As mentioned in chapter 5.1. 
216 Bowett, supra note 211, p 189. 
217 Amr, supra note 41, p 381. 
218 Ibid. 
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8 Appendices 
8.1 Index 
Organs and agencies entitled to ask the ICJ for an advisory opinion: 
United Nations (UN)  
*General Assembly  
*Security Council  
*Economic and Social Council  
Trusteeship Council  
Interim Committee of the General Assembly  
*Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgements  
Other Agencies:  
International Labour Organisation (ILO)  
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)  
*United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Unesco)  
*World Health Organization (WHO)  
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)  
International Finance Corporation (IFC)  
International Development Association (IDA)  
International Monetary Fund (IMF)  
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)  
International Telecommunication Union (ITU)  
World Meteorological Organization (WMO)  
*International Maritime Organization (IMO)1  
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)  
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)  
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)  
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)  
 
*Those organs and agencies that have asked for advisory opinions since 1946 are indicated by an asterisk.  
1Previously known as the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO).  
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8.2 Table 1 
 
The vertical column to the left lists the participating States and organisations that submitted 
written statements to the Court, prior to it delivering its advisory opinion concerning the 
wall built on occupied Palestinian territory. 
 
The horizontal column indicates the reasons given by the contributing States and 
organisations in their written statements to the Court for their not supporting the Court in 
rendering an advisory opinion regarding the question of the legal consequences, regarding 
the question on the legal consequences of the construction of a wall built on occupied 
Palestinian territory. 
 
The States and organisations are listed according to dates submitted to the ICJ. The written 
statements were to be submitted by January 30, 2004. 
State/Organisation Supported 
the 
Opinion 
Lack of 
Consent 
Complicate 
Negotiations 
Lack of 
Facts 
Lack of 
Useful 
Purpose 
Propriety 
of the 
Opinion 
Republic of Guinea X      
Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia 
X      
The League of Arab 
States 
X      
Arab Republic of 
Egypt 
X      
Republic of 
Cameroon 
 X X    
Russian Federation   X    
Australia  X X  X  
Palestine X      
United Nations X      
State of Kuwait X      
Lebanese Republic X      
Canada   X  X  
Syrian Arab  
Republic 
X      
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State/Organisation Supported 
the 
Opinion 
Lack of 
Consent 
Complicate 
Negotiations 
Lack of 
Facts 
Lack of 
Useful 
Purpose 
Propriety 
of the 
Opinion 
Swiss Confederation X      
Israel  X X X  X 
Republic of Yemen X      
United States of 
America 
 X X    
Kingdom of Morocco X      
Republic of Indonesia X      
Organization of the 
Islamic Conference 
X      
French Republic   X   X 
Italian Republic   X  X  
The Sudan X      
Republic of South 
Africa 
X      
Federal Republic of 
Germany 
 X X  X X 
Japan   X  X  
Kingdom of Norway   X    
United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland 
 X  X X  
Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan 
X      
Czech Republic X      
Hellenic Republic   X   X 
Ireland X      
Ireland on behalf of 
the European Union 
  X    
Republic of Cyprus   X    
Federative Republic 
of Brazil 
X      
Republic of Namibia X      
Republic of Malta   X    
Malaysia X      
Kingdom of the 
Netherlands 
  X    
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State/Organisation Supported 
the 
Opinion 
Lack of 
Consent 
Complicate 
Negotiations 
Lack of 
Facts 
Lack of 
Useful 
Purpose 
Propriety 
of the 
Opinion 
Republic of Cuba X      
Kingdom of Sweden X      
Kingdom of Spain   X    
Kingdom of Belgium   X  X  
Republic of Palau  X X   X 
Federated States of 
Micronesia 
 X X   X 
Republic of the 
Marshall Islands 
 X X   X 
Republic of Senegal X      
Democratic Republic 
of Korea 
X      
 
For more information on the content of these written statements, see: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm 
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8.3 Table 2 
 
States that voted against or abstained from endorsing the ICJ advisory opinion concerning 
the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall built on Occupied Palestinian 
Territory in GA Res. ES 10/15 of July 20 2004: 
 
States Voted Against Abstained 
Israel X  
United States of America X  
Australia X  
Micronesia X  
Marshall Islands X  
Palau X  
Cameron  X 
Canada  X 
El Salvador  X 
Nauru  X 
Papuasia-New Guinea  X 
Solomon Islands  X 
Tonga  X 
Uganda  X 
Vanuatu  X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
